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Abstract
This paper studies how newspapers’ adoption of Google’s Accelerated Mobile Page
(AMP), a publishing format for mobile devices enabling instant loading of web
pages, changes data allocation and thereby newspapers’ incentive to invest in qual-
ity of journalism when consumer data is used for targeted advertising. The adoption
of AMP allows Google to obtain consumer data from AMP articles and to combine
it with other sources of consumer data to improve targeting of the advertisements
served by Google on other websites. Even if such data combination increases static
efficiency, it can reduce dynamic efficiency when it lowers the ad revenue per news-
paper traffic and thereby reduces the quality of journalism. Newspapers face a
collective action problem as a newspaper’s adoption of AMP generates negative ex-
ternalities to other newspapers through data leakage. In addition to leveraging its
search monopoly power, Google can use a divide-and-conquer strategy to induce
newspapers to adopt AMP. We provide policy remedies.
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1 Introduction
There is a general tendency that major gatekeeping platforms use their power to channel
consumer interactions with business users into their walled gardens. For instance, the
development of Super Apps in China by the two major Chinese platforms (Alibaba and
Tencent) is an extreme example of such tendency: within each Super App, a consumer can
carry out almost all her activities such as shopping, ride hailing, reading news, gaming,
money transfer, flight bookings that she barely needs to leave the Super App. Inspired by
the Chinese Super Apps, Facebook and Uber adopted a similar business strategy. Another
example is Google’s tendency to “swallow web”, about which Shira Ovide, who writes the
On Tech newsletter of the New York Times, expresses her concern as follows:
“One longstanding issue is Google’s evolution from a website that pointed people to
the best links online to one that’s swallowing the web. ... Now, Google is more likely
to prominently show information or advertisements from its own computer systems or
scraped from other companies’ websites — and keep you within Google’s digital walls.
Google isn’t a front door to the internet anymore. It’s the house. (New York Times, On
Tech newsletter, September 24, 2020)”
A main reason for which major platforms expand their walled gardens instead of
embracing an open Internet is that they want to collect as much data as possible about
consumers’ various online activities, which allows them to infer consumers’ preferences and
to predict their behaviors. This motive is particularly relevant to ad-financed platforms
such as Google and Facebook, of which the business model consists in harvesting consumer
attention and data and monetizing them through targeted advertising (Zuboff (2019)).
Platforms’ access to business users’ data raises a very important question: how does such
data access affect the innovation of the platform ecosystem, in particular, the innovation
incentives of business users?1
In this paper, we address the above question in a specific context of newspapers’
adoption of Google’s Accelerated Mobile Page (henceforth AMP), which is an open source
publishing format for mobile devices enabling instant loading of web pages in mobile
browsers. Both the CMA Report (2020) of UK and that of U.S. House of Representatives
(2020) expressed concerns about the AMP.2 We study how the adoption of AMP changes
data allocation and thereby affects static and dynamic welfare when consumer data is used
1For instance, the question arises regarding Amazon’s use of business data of independent sellers who
sell on its marketplace, which is under investigation by the European Commission.
2See also Geradin and Katsifis (2019), Scott Morton and Dinielli (2020) and Srinivasan (2019).
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for targeted advertising. In particular, we focus on the impact on newspapers’ incentive
to invest in quality of journalism. Whereas our model is setup in the context of AMP,
we believe that the insights we obtain from our analysis can be applied more generally to
situations when platforms combine different sources of data for targeted advertising. For
instance, our results apply to Facebook as it offers Instant Articles (IA) format, which,
like AMP, allows mobile pages to load faster.
There are two aspects of AMP that are noteworthy and relevant to this paper: (i)
AMP articles are cached by Google and hence Google can collect data about consumers’
browsing activities on AMP articles. (See Appendix S of the CMA Report (2020), p. 3 and
p. 17): (ii) Google induces publishers to adopt AMP by leveraging its search monopoly
power, namely by giving adopters prominent positions in its mobile search result pages.
For instance, only news articles in the AMP format can appear in “Top Stories” carousel,
which attracts a majority of users’ attention. In addition, Google displays a ”lightning”
icon besides the link for AMP articles, to indicate that their pages can be loaded fast.
To answer the question of how AMP affects static and dynamic welfare, we build
a model in which symmetric and ad-financed newspapers compete by choosing quality
of journalism. Each consumer engages in two distinct online activities, activity A and
activity B. Activity A represents news consumption activity, which is divided into two
parts, direct visits and search-referral visits. By direct visits, we mean that each consumer
regularly browses news from her (single) favorite news outlet. By search-referral visits,
we mean that each consumer searches for news by using the monopolistic search engine
(SE) and reads news from multiple newspapers depending on the search result. Activity
B represents other web-browsing activities different from news consumption and it also
involves display advertising. We use a reduced-form approach to model the sector related
to activity B (called, sector B) and assume that the SE is the ad intermediary for the
websites/apps related to activity B and thereby obtains consumer browsing data from
them.
In our model, AMP affects both the product market (i.e. the newspaper market)
and the advertising market. Regarding the product market, first, adopting AMP has
the benefit of eliminating the loss of search referral traffic due to slow loading of pages.
Second, the SE leverages its search monopoly power to encourage the adoption of AMP
by promoting adopters’ rankings and demoting non-adopters’ rankings in search results.
A key component of our model consists in the link between data allocation and tar-
geted advertising revenue, which in turn affects newspapers’ investment incentive. In the
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baseline model, we assume that all newspapers partner with a third-party ad intermedi-
ary, T, to sell their ad inventories: hence, the SE has no access to newspaper-browsing
data in the absence of AMP. In contrast, when newspapers adopt AMP, the SE obtains
the browsing data from AMP articles, which it combines with its consumer data from
activity B in order to improve targeting of the ads in sector B. Therefore, the SE’s access
to AMP data improves static welfare for given quality of each newspaper: it improves
overall matching between ad inventories and advertisers. However this does not mean
that the SE’s access to AMP data improves dynamic welfare, which is our focus.
We assume that the ad revenue per newspaper traffic is increasing in the amount of
consumer data T has, but decreasing in the extent of overlap between T’s data and the
SE’s data. We find that the adoption of AMP creates two opposite effects for newspapers:
(i) search traffic enhancing effect due to the fast-loading of articles, which is positive;
(ii) data leakage effect3 which reduces the ad revenue per (direct) traffic and thereby is
negative. In a hypothetical benchmark in which AMP does not involve any change in data
allocation, AMP induces newspapers to invest more in the quality of journalism. However,
when the data leakage effect kicks in, AMP reduces the ad revenue per newspaper traffic
and thereby could reduce the quality of journalism. By contrast, we find that the SE has
no incentive to internalize the impact of its data combination on the quality of journalism.
We point out that newspapers face a collective action problem as a newspaper’s adop-
tion of AMP generates negative externalities to other newspapers through data leakage.
This is because if a newspaper adopts AMP, it not only leaks browsing data of its own
direct readers but also that of direct readers of other newspapers (Recall that a newspa-
per’s search referral traffic is composed of readers from many different newspapers). As
each individual newspaper doesn’t internalize this negative externality on its competitors
and the SE can leverage its market power in search to penalize non-adopters, we find that
there always exists an equilibrium in which all newspapers adopt AMP. An equilibrium
in which no newspaper adopts AMP exists only when the loss in ad revenue from “data
leakage” is strong enough.
To further dig into this collective action problem, we consider an extension where we
assume a fraction of newspapers uses the SE as their ad intermediary. In fact, Google’s
ad tech is the leader in ad intermediation for open display advertising (CMA, 2020). We
show that combining its market power in ad intermediation with its search monopoly
3data are leaked from newspapers’ point of view when the SE has access to browsing data from AMP
articles.
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power provides Google with an extra leverage to exploit the collective action problem.
More precisely, we find that it is a dominant strategy for a newspaper relying on the SE
as its ad intermediary to adopt AMP. Interestingly, we find that the adoption equilibrium
is the unique equilibrium when the proportion of newspapers who partners with the SE is
larger than a threshold. This result implies that the SE can employ a divide-and-conquer
strategy to gain control of newspaper data.
As policy remedies, we propose that Google should treat in a non-discriminatory way,
in its search results, all articles that meet an objective and neutral criterion of loading
speed and should not host articles on its server to capture the browsing data. This
will restore the equilibrium in the benchmark without change in data allocation, where
newspapers invest more in journalism quality in response to faster page-loading speed .
1.1 Related Literature
Due to the unprecedented scale and scope of data collection, there is an emerging body of
literature studying various economics issues related to the use of consumer data, including
privacy, data ownership, data as barrier to entry, data being used for price discrimination
etc. However, as far as we know, there has been no paper studying the data relationship
between business users and a platform who organizes two-sided interactions within its
walled garden, and how this affects the innovation in the platform’s ecosystem. So our
paper’s contribution is to add a new perspective to the discussion of data related issues.
In addition, by explicitly accounting for the role that consumer data allocation plays in
competition among newspapers and quality of journalism, our paper adds insights to two
following strands of literature.
Firstly, our paper is related to the literature which explores the impact of a news
aggregator (or a large digital platform such as Facebok) on competition among newspapers
and the quality of journalism. Dellarocas et al. (2013) considers a link economy in which a
news aggregator provides links to the highest quality content and studies how its presence
affects the equilibrium quality chosen by content providers depending on whether they
can (can not) link to each other. Jeon and Nasr (2016) decomposes the effects of a news
aggregator on newspaper traffic into a business-stealing effect and a readership-expansion
effect and analyze how they in turn affect journalism quality. de Cornière and Sarvary
(2020) explores how Facebook’s bundling of news content with user-generated content
impacts consumers’ attention allocation between social media and news sites and its
implication for the news industry. Jeon (2018) provides a survey which covers theoretical,
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empirical and experimental papers on news aggregators. These previous papers focus
on the impact of aggregators on newspapers’ traffic while taking the advertising revenue
per traffic as given. In contrast, our paper makes the ad revenue per traffic endogenous
to data allocation, which is in turn influenced by the search engine’s strategy. So our
contribution lies in offering a new channel through which large digital platforms can
impact news industry.
Secondly, our paper is related to the literature on media competition in two-sided
markets (Anderson and Coate (2005), Ambrus et al. (2016), Athey et al. (2018), Ander-
son et al. (2018), D’Annunzio and Russo (2019), Krämer et al. (2019) and Anderson and
Peitz (2020)): they study static media competition both on the consumer side and on
the advertiser side. Most of the previous literature considers an environment in which
publishers directly contract with advertisers to sell ad inventories. They either use a price
competition model in which ad prices are set by publishers or use a quantity competition
model in which the advertising market is cleared à la Cournot. Neither approach captures
the current situation in which the majority of online display advertising inventories are
sold in a programmatic way, i.e. through real-time auctions mediated by a complex chain
of ad tech service providers. D’Annunzio and Russo (2019) is an exception in exploring
how the presence of ad networks impacts media competition for advertisers, although they
adapt the quantity competition model of Ambrus et al. (2016). Furthermore, a common
assumption in the above-mentioned papers (except for Krämer et al. (2019)) is that the
boundary of the product (i.e. content) market coincides with that of the advertising mar-
ket, which means that the same set of medias that compete for readership also compete for
advertising dollars. However in reality, the boundary of online display advertising market
is much broader than that of the newspaper market as not only newspapers but also other
various types of content providers and social medias compete on the supply side by selling
ad inventories. Our paper is closely related to Krämer et al. (2019), which explores how
Facebook’s social-login impacts both competition in content market and competition in
advertising market. Social-login enables data sharing between a specific-interest content
provider and a social network (say Facebook), which improves user experience of the
content provider and ad targeting for both the content provider and the social network.
Our paper is complementary to theirs for the following reasons. First, they perform a
static analysis whereas we focus on dynamic efficiency in terms of quality choices. Second,
they consider a setup of a representative advertiser in which each publisher chooses an
ad price; we consider programmatic sale of display advertising through ad intermediaries
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which connect a large number of publishers to a large number of advertisers. Last, they
consider data sharing which improves ad targeting of both parities who share the data;
we consider data leakage from newspapers to the SE, which is facilitated by the exercise
of search monopoly power through promotion and demotion decisions in search results.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the baseline model in
which we assume all newspapers use ad tech service from a third-party ad intermediary.
Then, we establish two benchmarks in section 3. In section 4, we analyze how AMP
changes allocation of consumer data and consequently impacts the advertising revenue.
By taking content quality as given, we show that in static case, data leakage improves
social welfare. Then in section 5, we study how AMP changes the investment in content
quality and give the welfare analysis taking into account dynamic efficiency. In section
6, we examine the existence of both a symmetric equilibrium in which all newspapers
adopt the AMP format and another one in which none of newspapers adopt the format.
In section 7, we relax the assumption that all newspapers use the third-party ad tech
service by assuming that a fraction of newspapers use the SE’s ad tech. We show that
SE can use a divide-and-conquer strategy to induce the adoption of AMP. We propose a
policy remedy in section 8. Section 9 provides the conclusion. Lastly, readers may refer to
appendix A for an introduction to open display advertising market, which provides some
stylized facts that guide our modeling choices.
2 Baseline Model
Figure 1 gives an overview of the industry structure in our model.
2.1 Newspaper market
There are n symmetric online newspapers competing: they have a symmetric demand and
a symmetric cost. n is not a small number: the meaning of this assumption is clearer later
on. The newspapers are horizontally differentiated and are financed by online advertising.
Each newspaper i chooses quality qi at a cost c(qi) which is strictly increasing and strictly
convex with c(0) = 0. Let q ≡ (q1, ..., qn) and q−i ≡ (q1, ..., qi−1, qi+1,..., qn)
There is a measure 1 of consumers. Consumers have heterogeneous taste for newspa-
pers. Each consumer has a single preferred newspaper and divides her news reading time
between reading by directly visiting her preferred newspaper’s site and reading articles
found by search. Search is mediated by a monopoly search engine (SE), which provides
6
Figure 1: Industry Structure
Notes. The blue rectangle represents the content market in which newspapers compete
in quality for both direct traffic and search referral traffic, but they don’t compete with
sites in sector B for visitors. The green rectangle represents the ad intermediation market
where two ad intermediaries (SE and T) compete in bidding for ad impressions on behalf
of advertisers.
personalized rankings of news articles in its search result. Therefore, each newspaper has
direct traffic and search referral traffic.
Newspapers have symmetric demand functions. The direct demand for newspaper i is
given by Dd,i(q) = Dd,i(qi,q−i). The search referral demand for newspaper i is given by
Ds,i(q) = Ds,i(qi,q−i). Note that the search referral demand is conditional on having no








. We make the following assumption on the newspa-
per demand.
Assumption A1 (i) Dd,ii > 0, D
d,i





Dd,ij ≥ 0 when q = q1 = ... = qn and the same for Ds,i(q);
(iii) Dd,iii ≤ 0,D
d,i
ij ≤ 0, j 6= i and the same for Ds,i(q).
A1 (i) means that an increase in qi increases the demand for i, while an increase in
qj reduces the demand for i. A1 (ii) means that at symmetric quality, if all newspapers
increase their quality, it at least weakly increases each newspaper’s demand. This is the
market expansion effect. The concavity of the demands in A1 (iii) is a sufficient condition
to satisfy the S.O.C.of profit maximization of each newspaper. As long as the F.O.C. is
a sufficient condition for profit maximization, we can dispense with it. The property of
cross-derivative Dd,iij ≤ 0, j 6= i implies that quality choices are strategic substitutes.
The role of AMP. For search referral traffic, it is convenient to think that the demand
is determined by two stages. In the first stage, consumers visit the SE to search for news
and, given the search result, decide which links to click-through. The demand determined
at this stage is captured by Ds,i(q). In the second stage, consumers are directed by the
SE to the news websites of which the links are clicked. In this process, consumers may
suffer from slow loading of pages such that they decide not to read the news. We assume
the loss rate is δ ∈ [0, 1]. As a result, the final search referral traffic is (1 − δ)Ds,i(q).
To overcome the slow loading issue, the SE introduces Accelerated Mobile Page (AMP)
which enables instant loading of pages. We normalize the loss rate for AMP articles to
zero. Similarly, we normalize the loss rate of direct traffic to 0.
2.2 Advertising market and consumer data allocation
In addition to news consumption activity (called activity A), each consumer also uses In-
ternet to visit other ad-financed content providers’ applications/websites. For simplicity,
we aggregate all other websites different from newspapers into a single sector called B. Al-
though the sites (or apps) in sector B don’t compete with newspapers on the content side,
they do compete with the latter on the advertising side by offering targeted advertising.
Both newspapers and sites in sector B sell their ad inventories through real time
auctions mediated by ad tech service providers. We consider a duopoly ad tech market:
there is competition between the ad tech system of the SE and an alternative system based
on third-party ad intermediaries denoted T. We assume that the sites/apps in sector B
use the ad tech service of the SE. By contrast, we assume in the baseline model that
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newspapers rely on the ad tech service of T. We later on extend the baseline model to a
situation in which a fraction of them use the ad tech service of the SE.
An ad tech system’s targeting ability and thereby advertising revenue depends on
how much consumer data it has. We now first characterize data allocation between the
two systems. Let Ωx be the complete data set generated from all of consumer x’s online
activities. In our model, we have Ωx = ωx,d ∪ ωx,s ∪ ωx,B, where ωx,k represents the set of
browsing data generated by consumer x’s activity k ∈ {d, s, B}. (Recall that a consumer’s
news browsing activity (A) is further divided into direct visit (d) and search-referral visit
(s).)
Then let Ωx,h be the set of data that ad intermediary h ∈ {SE, T} has about consumer
x. An ad tech system gains access to the data of a consumer’s activity conducted on its
customer’s website/app if it is able to identify her. We assume in the benchmark case
without AMP, ad tech T can perfectly identify consumers in direct traffic but cannot
identify consumers in search traffic. Therefore, Ωx,T = ωx,d. Meanwhile, as ad tech SE
has access to data generated by consumer’s activity B, we have Ωx,SE = ωx,B. We will
see later in section 4 how AMP affects data allocation.
Next we adopt a reduced-form approach in building the relationship between adver-
tising revenue per traffic and data allocation, by abstracting away from the details of
real-time auction. Let the advertising revenue associated with a unit of traffic in activity
k where the ads are served by ad tech system h be
αk,h(Ω
x,h,Ωx,h ∩ Ωx,−h)
where k ∈ {d, s, B}, h ∈ {SE, T} and −h represents the rival ad tech system. Therefore,
we characterize the competition between two ad tech systems by letting the advertising
revenue of an ad tech not only depend on the amount of data it owns, but also the extent
of overlap between the two ad tech systems’ data sets.
And we impose the following assumption on this advertising revenue function:
Assumption B1 αk,h(Ω
x,h,Ωx,h ∩ Ωx,−h) increases with Ωx,h given Ωx,−h, and decreases
with Ωx,h ∩ Ωx,−h given Ωx,h for each h ∈ {SE, T}.4
What does this assumption mean? The first part says that the effect of increasing the
amount of data held by ad tech system h on its advertising revenue is positive. Holding the
4We provide a microfoundation for this assumption in Appendix B.
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effect of Ωx,h∩Ωx,−h, this is intuitive as more data enables better targeting. Furthermore,
this effect stays positive even if we take into account the effect through Ωx,h∩Ωx,−h (given
Ωx,−h). To understand it, consider a data merger such that a subset of the rival’s data,
Ωx,−h −Ωx,h, is added to Ωx,h. This should increase the ad revenue of h even if the effect
from better targeting is mitigated since this part of data is also possessed by the rival ad
tech −h.
To explain the second part of B1, consider the case in which initially Ωx,h∩Ωx,−h = ∅
holds and then Ωx,−h expands from Ωx,−h to Ω̃x,−h = Ωx,−h∪Ωx,h. More precisely, suppose
that consumer x is a direct reader of newspaper 1. Then, in the absence of AMP, Ωx,T =
ωx,d is the set of data that ad tech T has about the consumer and Ωx,SE = ωx,B is the
set of data that the SE has about the consumer from her activity B. If the two activities
are completely uncorrelated (i.e. ωx,d ∩ ωx,B = ∅), the product which appeals most to
the consumer inferred from the data set ωx,d will be different from the one inferred from
ωx,B. If the quality of the data in ωx,d is much better than the one in ωx,B, the ad revenue
per direct traffic of consumer x to newspaper 1 would be much higher than advertising
revenue per traffic of consumer x in sector B . However, in the presence of AMP, if the
SE gets access to the consumer x’s data ωx,s generated by referring her search to AMP
articles of numerous newspapers, then Ω̃x,SE = ωx,B ∪ωx,s. In addition, if ωx,s is strongly
correlated with ωx,d, this may allow the SE to infer the best match product that would
be advertised by newspaper 1 alone in the absence of AMP. Hence, the SE can engage in
advertising arbitrage, which reduces the advertising revenue of newspaper 1.
Note that the advertising revenue αk,h(Ω
x,h,Ωx,h ∩ Ωx,−h) also depends on the nature
of ad inventories, i.e. with which activity k the ad impression is associated. First, even
under a symmetric data allocation, αd and αB could still be different. This is because
the nature of the site on which advertising is displayed affects the willingness to pay of
advertisers and thereby the advertising revenue. For instance, reputable advertisers do
not want to show their ads besides hate/racism content. Second, αd,T is different from
αs,T . As we assumed above that ad tech system T is unable to identify consumers in
newspaper’s search-referral traffic, Ωx,T = ∅ for ad inventories associated with activity
s. This means that newspapers can only use contextual advertising for search referral
traffic, which only uses context data but not consumer’s behavioral data. Hence, we add
a simplifying assumption:
Assumption B2 All newspapers use contextual advertising for search-referral traffic such
that ad revenue for search-referral traffic is constant and given by αs ≡ αs,T (∅,∅) no mat-
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ter data allocation.
B2 allows us to focus on the substitution between the ad revenue from direct traffic and
the ad revenue in sector B. It plays a role mainly in the extension in which we analyze a
divide-and-conquer strategy and makes the analysis tractable. Due to assumption B1, the
contextual advertising revenue αs is lower than the revenue generated from personalized
ad which allows for the use of consumer’s behavioral data.5
Finally, we introduce the following shorthand notation for the advertising revenues in
the absence of AMP.
αNd ≡ αd,T (Ωx,T ,Ωx,T ∩ Ωx,SE) = αd,T (ωx,d, ωx,d ∩ ωx,B)
αNB ≡ αB,SE(Ωx,SE,Ωx,SE ∩ Ωx,T ) = αB,SE(ωx,B, ωx,B ∩ ωx,d)
where the superscript N refers to no AMP.
2.3 Timing
We consider the following timing: Each newspaper simultaneously decides whether or not
to adopt the AMP and chooses its quality.
3 Two Benchmarks
In this section, we study two benchmarks.
3.1 Benchmark of no AMP




d,i(q) + αs(1− δ)Ds,i(q)
]
− c(qi)
5For empirical evidence showing that advertisers bid more for impressions which enables identifying
consumers than for those with only context information available, see Appendix F p. 29 of CMA Final
Report, Beales (2010) and Srinivasan (2019). For instance, according to the CMA (2020)’s study of
data generated by Google’s Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT) of display advertising, UK publishers
earned around 70 percent less revenue overall when they were unable to sell inventory using personalised
advertising (i.e. when cookies were not available) but competed against others who could.
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− c′′(qi) < 0,
which is satisfied under A1.
Proposition 1 In the absence of AMP, the quality at the symmetric equilibrium, denoted






N , ..., qN) + αs(1− δ)Ds,ii (qN , ..., qN)
]
= c′(qN) for all i = 1, ..., n.
3.2 Benchmark of AMP without changes in data allocation
Consider here a second benchmark in which we consider a situation in which all newspa-
pers adopt the AMP format but there is no change in the allocation of data. In other
words, the advertising revenue is still given by αNd and α
N
B .
AMP allows fast loading of articles referred by the SE. Hence, we assume that given
q, when all newspapers adopt the AMP format, the search-referral demand for newspaper
i is given by Ds,i(q) while AMP does not affect the demand for direct traffic.
Therefore, it is immediate that:
Proposition 2 Consider the benchmark in which AMP is adopted by all newspapers but
it does not affect the allocation of consumer data.











= c′(q∗) for all i = 1, ..., n.
(ii) Hence, AMP increases the quality of journalism: q∗ > qN .
This second benchmark is very closely related to the policy remedy we propose at the
end of this paper.
12
4 AMP with changes in data allocation: static analysis
Now we consider the main scenario in which AMP changes allocation of consumer data.
In this section, we consider the static case in which AMP does not affect quality choices
in any of the two sectors.
4.1 Data allocation under AMP and advertising revenue
The SE hosts in its own server AMP articles for search referral. Therefore, when a
consumer clicks on an article, she consumes the article on the SE’s site, implying that
the SE collects the data generated by the consumer’s reading/browsing. Suppose that all
newspapers adopt the AMP format. We below present its consequences in data allocation
and in advertising market.
(i) (data leakage) the SE has access to ωx,s for any consumer x.
(ii) (data combination) the SE can combine ωx,s with ωx,B to build a more refined
profile of each consumer x. We assume that the SE can identify each consumer when
she uses either the search service or engages in activity B. This is possible since the
SE has a good technology to track consumers across many sites/apps/devices.
(iii) (no loss of inventories) We assume that newspapers still have the control right over
displaying advertising in articles of the AMP format.
(iv) (no data sharing) The SE does not share personal level data from search referral
traffic, i.e. it shares the data with newspapers in a way that they cannot identify
consumers.
Therefore, the ad revenue per unit of newspaper’s direct traffic and the ad revenue in
sector B respectively become:
αMd ≡ αd,T (Ωx,T ,Ωx,T ∩ Ωx,SE) = αd,T (ωx,d, ωx,d ∩ {ωx,B ∪ ωx,s})
αMB ≡ αB,SE(Ωx,SE,Ωx,SE ∩ Ωx,T ) = αB,SE(ωx,B ∪ ωx,s, {ωx,B ∪ ωx,s} ∩ ωx,d).
where the superscript M refers to AMP (as we use A for activity A, we prefer using M).
Hence, we have
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Lemma 1 Suppose that all newspapers adopt the AMP format. This reduces the adver-
tising revenue for direct traffic, does not affect the ad revenue for search referral traffic









Suppose that AMP does not affect quality choice in any of the two sectors. Assuming
that all newspapers adopt the AMP format, we here study how AMP changes the static
welfare. Hence, each newspaper chooses quality qN and demand is given by Dd,1(qN) =
... = Dd,n(qN) ≡ Dd(qN) for direct traffic and Ds,1(qN) = ... = Ds,n(qN) ≡ Ds(qN)
for search referral traffic where qN = (qN , ..., qN). Regarding sector B, we use a reduced
form approach: let DB(qNB ) represent the total demand corresponding to a symmetric
quality choice among competing websites qNB (α
N
B ) in that sector. In addition, due to use
of reduced form in constructing ad price, we put the following assumption on advertiser’s
surplus:
Assumption B3 (i) Given total advertising inventory, improving targeting in a subset
of inventory increases total advertising surplus. (ii) Advertisers retain a constant share β
of the total advertising surplus regardless of the presence of AMP;
This assumption implies that we can express the social surplus generated in advertising
market as 1
1−β times the advertising industry profit, which is the joint advertising revenue
of newspapers, sites in sector B and ad tech intermediaries:
n(1− τT + τT )
[
αNd D
d(qN) + αs(1− δ)Ds(qN)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
a single newspaper’s ad revenue
+(1− τSE + τSE) αNBDB(qNB )︸ ︷︷ ︸
total ad revenue of
sites in sector B
The welfare change induced by AMP comes from: (i) the change in consumer welfare
due to elimination of traffic loss, which is obviously positive; (ii) the change in the social





d(qN ) + nαsD
























The last inequality follows from B3 (i).
Proposition 3 Under B1-B3, AMP strictly increases static welfare.
AMP improves static welfare even if AMP does not affect the loss rate of search-referral
traffic (which is equivalent to the case where loss rate δ ' 0). This is because data leakage
allows SE to use the data from search referral traffic to improve targeting efficiency in
sector B, which in turn increases total surplus in advertising industry.
5 AMP with changes in data allocation: dynamic analysis
In this section, we assume that all newspapers adopt the AMP format and study how
AMP changes investment in quality and thereby welfare. The analysis of each newspaper’s
incentive to adopt the AMP format is done in the next sections.
5.1 Quality choice

















− c′(qi) = 0.









− c′′(qi) < 0.
Proposition 4 When all newspapers adopt the AMP format, the quality at the symmetric






M , ..., qM) + αsD
s,i
i (q
M , ..., qM)
]
= c′(qM) for all i = 1, ..., n.
In order to facilitate comparison between qN and qM , let us assume Ds,ii (q, ..., q) =
γDd,ii (q, ..., q) at any q > 0. Then, we have
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Proposition 5 The adoption of the AMP format reduces the quality of journalism (qN >
qM) if and only if
αNd + γ(1− δ)αs > αMd + γαs,
The above proposition shows a clear trade-off:
αNd − αMd︸ ︷︷ ︸
reduction in ad revenue
from direct traffic
due to data allocation effect
− γδαs︸︷︷︸
increase in ad revenue
from search referral traffic
due to faster loading
Let qMB (> q
N
B ) be the symmetric quality that prevails in sector B after all newspapers
adopted the AMP format. This is because data leakage raises advertising revenue per
traffic in sector B and in turn increases the marginal benefit of investing in quality.
5.2 Welfare analysis
5.2.1 SE’s profit
We show below that the SE always has an incentive to induce newspapers to adopt the
AMP format. Assuming that the SE has no consumer-facing services related to activity
B, the SE’s profit without AMP is
ΠN = τSEαNBD
B(qNB ).
where τSE > 0 is the ad tech tax of the SE.
After the adoption of AMP by all newspapers, the SE’s profit becomes
ΠM = τSEαMB D
B(qMB ).
AMP increases SE’s profit by increasing the ad revenue per traffic in sector B and
also by expanding the ad inventory in sector B as the increased ad revenue raises the
symmetric quality that prevails in sector B after the adoption of AMP by newspapers.
Proposition 6 The SE always gains from newspapers’ adoption of the AMP format.
Therefore, even if the adoption of the AMP format reduces the quality of journalism, the
SE has no incentive to internalize it.
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We assumed that the SE has no consumer-facing services related to activity B. In
reality, Google owns many consumer-facing services, which will even strengthen our results
as Google will retain the whole benefit of data leakage instead of just having a fraction
τSE of it.
5.2.2 Comparison of newspaper profit
When there is no AMP, equilibrium newspaper profit is:
πN(αNd , δ) = (1− τT )[αNd Dd(qN) + αs(1− δ)Ds(qN)]− c(qN)
When there is AMP, equilibrium newspaper profit becomes:
πM = (1− τT )[αMd Dd(qM) + αsDs(qM)]− c(qM)
To facilitate the comparison between these two profits, we introduce the following as-







< 0. These two assumptions mean that the direct effect of a positive ex-
ogenous shock to the industry, such as increased ad price or reduced loss rate, dominates





= −(1− τT )[αNd Σnj=1D
d,i
j (q
N ) + αs(1− δ)Σnj=1D
s,i
j (q
N )− c′(qN )]∂q
N
∂δ
+ (1− τT )αsDs,i(qN )
= −(1− τT )[αNd Σj 6=iD
d,i
j (q




the effect of intensified competition (-)
+ (1− τT )αsDs,i(qN )︸ ︷︷ ︸
the direct effect of positive shock (+)
> 0






< 0, (1) the
presence of AMP reduces the newspaper industry profit when δ is close to zero; (2) When
aMd is close enough to a
N
d , there exists a threshold 0 < δ̃ < 1 determined by π
N(δ̃) = πM(δ̃),
such that AMP increases the newspaper industry profit if δ̃ < δ < 1.






< 0, when δ = 0, we have
πN(αNd , 0) > π
M , which implies the presence of AMP reduces news industry profit. (2)
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Taking the values of δ and αNd as given, we have limαMd ↑αNd π
M = πN(αNd , 0). This property
together with the assumption ∂π
N
∂δ
< 0 guarantees the existence of threshold 0 < δ̃ < 1.
5.2.3 Comparison of consumer surplus in content market
To facilitate welfare analysis, in this section we impose a specific structure on demand
functions. Regarding the demand for direct traffic, suppose that each consumer would
read kd news articles when she visits her favorite news outlet directly. Assume that qi
stands for the quality of a single article in newspaper i. Then newspaper i’s overall quality
is kdqi. As consumers single-homing on one newspaper in terms of direct traffic, we apply





x,i, i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n
where “0” stands for the outside option whose quality is q0. In addition, ε
d
x,i is i.i.d.
according to Type I Extreme Value distribution with scale parameter µd > 0. Each
consumer chooses the newspaper that delivers the highest utility.







µd . When we assume that vd(·) is increasing and concave and that µd > 1,
this demand function satisfies the assumptions in A1. From this specification, we obtain




In addition to direct demand, each consumer also has demand for ks pieces of news
via search. We assume that each consumer makes ks independent search queries and that
each query is associated with a separate discrete-choice problem. As a result, a consumer
multihomes in terms of search-referral traffic in the sense that she would read articles from
different newspapers in different searches. Let consumer x ’s utility from reading an article
of newspaper i discovered through the SE be U sx,i = lnv
s(qi)+ε
s
x,i, i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n in which
εsx,i is i.i.d. according to Type I Extreme Value distribution with scale parameter µ
s > 0.
These preference shocks are independent across search queries and also uncorrelated with
that of direct traffic. Therefore, the search-referral demand of newspaper i without AMP




, where ṽs(·) = (vs(·))
1
µs .









+ εBx,0, in which
εBx and ε
B
x,0 are as before i.i.d. according to Type I Extreme Value distribution with scale
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parameter µB > 0. And accordingly ṽB(·) denotes the normalized valuation on quality.
















Note that only the first two terms in CSN depend on δ.
Lemma 2 When there is no AMP, (1) the optimal quality qN is decreasing in δ; (2)
consumer surplus CSN is decreasing in δ.














− (1− τT )αsDs,ii (q−i) = 0
By assumption A1, we have Ds,ii > 0, D
d,i
ij < 0 and D
s,i




As optimal quality is decreasing in the loss rate δ, it is immediate that CSN is de-
creasing in δ.
















Note that CSM does not depend on δ.
Proposition 8 (i) If CSN(δ = 0) ≤ CSM , consumer surplus is always higher with
AMP; (ii) If CSN(δ = 0) > CSM , there exists a threshold δ̄ > 0 determined by CSN =
CSM such that when 0 ≤ δ ≤ min{δ̄, 1}, consumer surplus is lower with AMP; when
min{δ̄, 1} < δ ≤ 1, consumer surplus is higher with AMP.
Proof. (i). This is straightforward from part 2 of Lemma 2 that consumer surplus CSN is
decreasing in δ. (ii). Recall the condition determining qN > qM is (αNd −αMd )−γδαs > 0.
Whenever δ satisfies (αNd −αMd )− γδαs < 0, we have qM > qN(δ) such that the quality of
newspapers and sites in sector B both improved. Then we have CSM > CSN(δ) under
this condition. This result together with the condition CSN(δ = 0) > CSM and Lemma 2
implies there is a threshold δ̄, below which CSN > CSM and above which CSN < CSM .
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This proposition suggests that when AMP lowers the quality of journalism, AMP’s
impact on consumer surplus depends on the trade-off between the gain from higher quality
of sites in sector B and the loss from lower quality of journalism. For instance, consider
the case of δ ≈ 0, where AMP doesn’t increase much loading speed but reduces the
equilibrium quality of newspapers through data leakage. If AMP lowers consumer surplus
in this case, then AMP reduces consumer surplus for any δ below a certain threshold.
5.2.4 Comparison of social welfare
As in our model newspapers and sites in sector B are ad-financed, they create values by
providing content to consumers on the one side and by selling advertising inventories to
advertisers through ad intermediaries on the other side. Under the assumption B3, the
aggregate social welfare without AMP is:
WN = CSN − nc(qN)− cB(qNB )︸ ︷︷ ︸






d(qN) + nαs(1− δ)Ds(qN) + αNBDB(qNB )
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
social surplus in advertising industry
And the aggregate social welfare with AMP is:






s(qM) + αMB D
B(qMB )
}
We focus on situations where newspapers are sufficiently differentiated (i.e. µd and
µs are sufficiently large) such that newspapers always underinvest in quality relative to
a social planner who chooses a uniform quality level of newspapers to maximizes social
welfare. For instance, in the case without AMP, the newspapers’ private incentive of
investing in quality is given by the first order condition in proposition 1.And the first




































































When newspapers are sufficiently differentiated, the third term, which is the business
stealing effect, is weak and dominated by the first two positive terms. As a result, social
planner has a higher incentive of improving newspaper’s quality.
In the following proposition, we give a sufficient condition for the adoption of AMP
to be socially efficient:
Proposition 9 If qM > qN , then aggregate social welfare is higher with AMP (i.e.,
WM > WN).
See proof in appendix.
In this case, the effect of AMP on social welfare can be decomposed into three parts:
(1) the adoption of AMP directly creates more surplus by eliminating the loss of traffic due
to slow loading; (2) a higher content quality in each sector improves consumer surplus in
each sector and creates more advertising opportunities by expanding traffic to newspapers
and sites in sector B; (3) data leakage to site B increases matching efficiency which further
increases surplus in advertising market.
However if the equilibrium quality of newspapers is lower with AMP, the effect of
AMP on welfare is ambiguous as it depends on:
(i) whether consumers are affected more by the decreased quality in journalism or by
the increased quality in sector B;
(ii) whether the effect of eliminating the loss of search-referral traffic δ brought by AMP
is large enough, which includes both consumer surplus increase and advertising
surplus increase.
(iii) whether the effect of increased ad inventory in sector B is high enough relative to
the effect of reduced inventory of newspapers;
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(iv) to what degree data leakage improves matching efficiency of ad inventories in sector
B.
Therefore, AMP is highly likely to reduce welfare when δ is close to zero, consumers
value the quality of newspapers much more than that of sector B and advertisers value
the ad inventory of newspapers much more than that of sector B.
The next proposition provides a sufficient condition for AMP to reduce welfare. In
the proposition, we shut down both the effect on the traffic loss rate and the one on the
quality in sector B in order to focus on the main trade-off but by continuity the result
carries over even the two effects are small.
Proposition 10 Suppose δ = 0, qMB = q
N
B ≡ qB and qM  qN . Then, if the positive
effect of data leakage on advertising surplus is dominated by the negative effect of lower
quality of journalism on welfare, the aggregate social welfare is lower with AMP (i.e.,
WM < WN)
Proof. Under the condition δ = 0 and qMB = q
N
B ,
WM(qM)−WN(qN , δ = 0) = WM(qM)−WN(qM , δ = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
efficient effect of data leakage
−
[
WN(qN , δ = 0)−WN(qM , δ = 0)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect of lower quality
The main trade-off is captured by the above equation. By taking the quality of newspa-
pers qM as given, the first one represents the positive effect of data leakage which leads
to improved matching in targeted advertising, as captured in the static welfare analysis.
The second one captures the negative effect of lower quality on welfare. As assumptions
on demand functions and cost functions guarantees that social surplus is concave in sym-
metric quality and qN is assumed to be lower than the social optimum, any quality lower
than qN induces even lower welfare.
In sum, when the efficient effect of data leakage is dominated by the negative effect of
lower quality, aggregate social welfare is lower.
6 Newspapers’ Incentive to Adopt the AMP Format
In this section, we study the adoption choice of newspaper i given all the others’ adoption
choices.
Consider first the equilibrium in which all adopt the AMP format. Does newspaper i
have an incentive to deviate by not adopting the AMP format when all other newspapers
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do? Let Ds,i(qi,q−i; i−) ≡ Ds|i−,i(qi,q−i) represent the demand from search referral for
newspaper i when newspaper i is the only non-adopter and hence is demoted in search
rankings by the SE. When n is not small, the demotion of newspaper i in search ranking
implies that its articles almost never appear in the first page of search results and hence
Ds|i−,i(qi,q−i) is close to zero. Let α
−
d be the ad revenue per traffic for newspaper i: we
have α−d ' αMd , since all direct readers of newspaper i are referred to AMP articles of other
newspapers by the SE and then the SE can draw valuable insights from these consumers’
browsing activities. Let qM−i ≡ (q1 = qM , ..., qi−1 = qM , qi+1 = qM , ..., qn = qM).
Formally, we assume:
Assumption A2 n is not small such that demotion of newspaper i in search ranking
makes Ds|i−,i(qi,q
M
−i) close to zero for any (qi,q
M
−i), which in turn implies that α
−
d (≥ αMd )
close to αMd .
Let q− be defined as







−i) + αs(1− δ)Ds|i−,i(qi,qM−i)
]
− c(qi).









≥ (1− τT )
[
α−dD
d,i(q−,qM−i) + αs(1− δ)Ds|i−,i(q−,qM−i)
]
− c(q−).















> (1− τT )
[
α−dD
d,i(q−,qM−i) + αs(1− δ)Ds|i−,i(q−,qM−i)
]
− c(q−)
where the last inequality holds from A2.
Proposition 11 Under A1-A2 and B1-B2, there exists an equilibrium in which all news-
papers adopt the AMP format.
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We emphasize that when δ ≈ 0, the SE’s leverage of its search monopoly power through
demotion of non-adopters’ positions is crucial in sustaining the all-adoption equilibrium.
As we can see in the above inequality, without the punishment in terms of ranking, non-
adoption won’t affect the search-referral traffic and remove the (small) negative impact
of data leakage on the advertising revenue in direct traffic. This gives newspaper i an
incentive not to adopt the AMP format.
Do we have an equilibrium in which no newspaper adopts the AMP format? Suppose
that such an equilibrium exists. Consider the deviation of newspaper i: it becomes the
only newspaper who adopts it such that the SE promotes its AMP articles in search
results. Let Ds,i(qi,q−i; i+) ≡ Ds|i+,i(qi,q−i) represent the demand from search referral
for newspaper i when newspaper i is the only adopter and hence is promoted in search
rankings by the SE. Let α+i be the ad revenue per traffic for newspaper i: we have
α+d ∈ (αMA , αNA ) where αNd > α
+
d is from the leakage of the browsing data on newspaper
i’s AMP articles and αMd < α
+
d is because this data leakage is much smaller than the
data leakage when all newspapers adopt the AMP format. Let qN−i ≡ (q1 = qN , ..., qi−1 =
qN , qi+1 = q
N , ..., qn = q
N).
We assume
Assumption A3 When newspaper i deviates by becoming the unique adopter of the AMP






















The first point says that the promotion in search ranking is a complementary input
to investment in quality such that it increases i’s marginal benefit of quality investment
in terms of search-referral traffic. The second point means that this increases i’s search
referral demand given a quality vector.
Let q+ be the quality choice of newspaper i after its deviation:

















d,i(qN ,qN−i) + αs(1− δ)Ds,i(qN ,qN−i)
]
− c(qN) (1)







A sufficient condition to satisfy the inequality is that the inequality holds when qN is
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replaced by q+: then, when we neglect (1 − τT ), the difference between the two can be
decomposed as
(αNd − α+i )Dd,i(q+,qN−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸






increase in search referral traffic
due to promotion and higher speed
Proposition 12 Under A1, A3 and B1-B2, there exists an equilibrium in which no news-
paper adopts the AMP format if (1) is satisfied.
In summary, the adoption equilibrium always exists and the no adoption equilibrium
can also exist if the loss from data leakage is large enough relative to the expansion of
search referral demand.
7 Extension: Divide-and-Conquer
In this section, we study how the SE can use a divide-and-conquer strategy to induce the
adoption of AMP. Google has leading ad tech in ad intermediation for the open display
advertising (CMA, 2020). We show that combining its market power in ad intermediation
with its search monopoly power allows the SE to use a divide-and-conquer strategy so as
to achieve the adoption equilibrium as the unique equilibrium. For this purpose, suppose
now that m(< n) number of newspapers use the ad tech service of the SE.
7.1 Without AMP
Let qN represent the quality vector in the equilibrium without AMP. Consider consumer
x, who is a direct reader of a newspaper which uses the ad tech service of T. When this
consumer visits other newspapers who use the ad tech service of the SE via search, her
browsing data is accessible to SE. Denote this data set as ωx,s(m), which represents data
leakage from the point of view of the newspaper, of which consumer x is a direct reader.
Then, the ad revenue per traffic from this consumer is given as follows depending on
whether it is a direct traffic to the newspaper or a traffic to a site in sector B:
αN,Td (m) ≡ αd,T (Ω





αN,TB (m) ≡ αB,SE(Ω










With some abuse of notation, the superscript T in αN,TB (m) denotes the advertising
revenue of a site in sector B per traffic from a consumer who is a direct reader of a
newspaper that uses the ad tech T. Here T doesn’t mean the ads of sites in sector B are
served by T as they are always assumed to be served by the SE.
Assumption B1 implies that αN,Td (m) strictly decreases with m and α
N,T
B (m) strictly
increases with m such that











What is important to notice here is that the newspapers which use the ad tech service
of the SE generate negative externalities to those which use the ad tech service of T
through data leakage measured by ωx,s(m).
Now consider consumer x′, who is a direct reader of a newspaper which uses the ad
tech service of the SE. The SE has access to both direct traffic data and search-referral
traffic data of the newspaper. Therefore, the ad revenue per traffic from this consumer is
given as follows depending on whether it is a direct traffic to the newspaper or a traffic
to a site in sector B:
αN,SEd (m) ≡ αd,SE(Ω
x,SE,Ωx,SE ∩ Ωx,SE) = αd,SE(ωx,d ∪ ωx,s(m) ∪ ωx,B, ωx,d ∪ ωx,s(m) ∪ ωx,B)
αN,SEB (m) ≡ αB,SE(Ω
x,SE,Ωx,SE ∩ Ωx,SE) = αB,SE(ωx,d ∪ ωx,s(m) ∪ ωx,B, ωx,d ∪ ωx,s(m) ∪ ωx,B)
Recall that in Section 2, we define advertising revenue as αk,h(Ω
x,h,Ωx,h∩Ωx,−h). The




x,SE,Ωx,SE ∩Ωx,T ) is because both the ads for direct traffic and the ads for traffic
in sector B associated with consumer x are served by the SE. So the “rival” ad tech −h
becomes the SE.
B1 implies that both αN,SEd (m) and α
N,SE
B (m) strictly increase with m.
The equilibrium in the absence of AMP is characterized by qN = (qN,T , . . . , qN,T ,







N) + αs(1− δ)Ds,ii (qN)
]
= c′(qi);












Let l with 0 ≤ l ≤ n−m represent the number of the newspapers which adopt the AMP
format among those who rely on the ad tech service of T. Then, the SE has access to the
browsing data generated by search-referral to m+ l number of newspapers. Hence, given
ωx,s(m), the ad revenue per traffic is given as follows depending on the type of traffic:
αM,Td (m, l) = α
N,T
d (m+ l), α
M,T
B (m, l) = α
N,T
B (m+ l)
αM,SEd (m, l) = α
N,SE
d (m+ l), α
M,SE
B (m, l) = α
N,SE
B (m+ l)
However, the SE promotes AMP articles and demotes non-AMP articles, which makes
the data leakage ωx,s(m) larger when l > 0 number of newspapers adopt the AMP format
than when there is no AMP. When we take into account such distortion in search ranking,
we have:
αM,Td (m, l) < α
N,T
d (m+ l), α
M,T
B (m, l) > α
N,T
B (m+ l)
αM,SEd (m, l) < α
N,SE
d (m+ l), α
M,SE
B (m, l) > α
N,SE
B (m+ l)
We first show that it is a dominant strategy for a newspaper using the ad tech service
of the SE to adopt the AMP format. Consider newspaper i using the ad tech service of the
SE. Consider a given quality vector q including qi and suppose that the adoption decision
of any newspaper different from i is also given. If newspaper i adopts the AMP, it improves
its ranking and eliminates the traffic loss from slow loading and the SE keeps having access
to the browsing data generated by search-referral to m+ l number of newspapers. So the
only change in terms of data leakage is that i’s adoption expands ωx,s(m) as the SE
promotes its AMP articles, which in turn increases αM,SEd (m, l) from B1. Therefore, it is
a dominant strategy for newspaper i to adopt the AMP format.
Lemma 3 Under A1 and B1-B2, it is a dominant strategy for a newspaper using the ad
tech service of the SE to adopt the AMP format.
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Therefore, in what follows, we assume that all newspapers using the ad tech service
of the SE adopt the AMP format.
From an argument analogous to the one used for Proposition 11, it is straightforward
to see the existence of the adoption equilibrium in which all newspapers adopt the AMP
format.
Proposition 13 Under A1-A2 and B1-B2, the equilibrium in which all newspapers adopt
the AMP format always exists.
In what follows, we show that for m large enough, the adoption equilibrium is the
unique equilibrium. Consider an equilibrium candidate in which no newspaper using
the ad tech serive of T adopts the AMP format. Let Ds|−,i(qi,q−i;m) (respectively,
Ds|+,i(qi,q−i;m)) represent the demand from search referral when newspaper i is a non-
adopter (respectively, an adopter) when there are m number of adopters.
The quality vector in the equilibrium candidate is characterized by qM = (qM,T , . . . , qM,T ,







M) + αs(1− δ)Ds|−,ii (qM ;m)
]
= c′(qM,T );













A newspaper using the service of T has an incentive to deviate by adopting the AMP
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− c(qM,T )







where q̂ is defined as













A sufficient condition is that the inequality holds at q̂ = qM,T , which is equivalent to[










Under A2, the inequality is satisfied in a straightforward way for m = n − 1. More
generally, the externalities imposed by those m number of adopters on non-adopters are
composed of two main elements. First, the SE’s promotion of AMP articles and demotion
of non-AMP articles mean that Ds|−,i(qM ;m) is pretty small for m large. Second, this in
turn implies αM,Td (m, 1)− α
M,T
d (m, 0) is small. Therefore, αsD
s|+,i(qM ;m+ 1) dominates
all the other terms in the above inequality and hence it is satisfied. The same logic applies
to an equilibrium candidate in which l(< n−m) number of newspapers using the ad tech
service of T adopt the AMP format in addition to the m number of newspapers.
Proposition 14 When consumers click mostly on top search results, there exists a thresh-
old m̂ such that for m > m̂, the unique equilibrium is such that all newspapers adopt the
AMP format.
The proposition shows that by using a divide-and-conquer strategy, the SE can leverage
its search monopoly power to induce all newspapers to adopt the AMP format.
8 Policy Remedy
The policy remedy we propose is the following: (i) the SE should propose an objective
criterion of loading speed and should treat all articles meeting such criterion in a non-
discriminatory way and (ii) the SE should not host articles in its server. The second
removes data leakage. If all newspapers adopt some technology meeting the speed crite-
rion, the policy remedy leads to the equilibrium we described in the benchmark of AMP
without change in data allocation (characterized in Proposition 2).
Part (i) of the policy remedy means that the SE can demote articles which do not meet
the speed criterion. Such exercise of search market power is socially desirable as long as
newspapers’ adoption of speed-increasing technology improves welfare. If the SE does not
discriminate articles at all, newspapers may not adopt the technology for instance when
the adoption requires each newspaper to pay a fixed cost. This is because ad-financed
newspapers insufficiently internalize consumer surplus generated by such adoption.
9 Conclusion
AMP allows Google to obtain data from articles stored in this format and to combine it
with data from other sources in order to improve targeting of the ads served by Google.
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Even if such data combination improves static welfare, we found that it can reduce dy-
namic welfare which accounts for the change in quality of newspapers. In particular,
we showed that the search engine has no incentive to internalize the impact of its data
combination on newspapers’ incentive to invest in quality of journalism.
In this paper we considered only Google’s serving ads for third-party sites/apps. How-
ever in reality Google owns many consumer-facing products and serves ads in these prod-
ucts as well. Considering Google-owned ad inventory will strengthen the dynamic conflict
between data combination and investment in content that we identified.
Our paper compared two particular data combinations depending on whether AMP
exists or not. Therefore, it calls for future research addressing a more fundamental and
general question: what is the optimal scope of data combination that takes into account
both static and dynamic efficiency?
If the optimal scope of data combination turns out to be narrower than the current
practice of Google which combines a vast majority of data from third-party publishers with
its own first-party data, a policy intervention would be required to implement the optimal
scope, because a collective action problem would prevent publishers from maintaining
proper control of their data. In particular, Google can leverage both its search monopoly
power and its dominance in the ad intermediation for open display advertising in order
to take advantage of the collective action problem.
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Appendix
A Industry Background on Open Display Market
In this section, we briefly introduce how open programmatic display advertising market
works to help readers get familiar with the context of our model and the motivation behind
our modeling choices. For further references, see CMA Report (2020) Final Report and its
online appendices for a detailed and comprehensive survey of digital advertising market.
Also see Geradin and Katsifis (2019) and Srinivasan (2019) for their analysis of online
display advertising issues from the angle of competition law.
Online display advertising market is composed of two segments, depending on whether
ad inventories are sold through intermediaries. The first one involves own-and-operated
platforms such as Google and Facebook, which sell a large amount of ad inventories from
their consumer-facing services through their proprietary ad interfaces,.
The other segment, which is the focus of this paper, is open display advertising market,
in which a large number of publishers (such as newspapers, blogs, app owners and any
other content/service providers) sell their ad inventory to a large number of advertisers
through a complex chain of third-party ad intermediaries. These intermediaries are also
called ad techs and they organize and/or participate in real-time bidding auctions on
behalf of publishers and advertisers. Examples of open display ads are the banner or
video ads we frequently see on websites and apps.
How consumer data is used in personalized targeting? Display ads are usually
personally targeted, thus consumer data plays an important role in determining what ads
are relevant to a consumer and how much advertisers bid for ad impressions. To learn
consumers’ purchasing intents, ad techs track consumers’ online activities across web and
devices to infer what products might appeal to them. For instance, an ad intermediary
can predict that a consumer may be interested in seeing the ad of latest iPhone if he
spends a lot of time reading tech news and reviews on smart phones. Based on the
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collected data, the essential work of ad techs is to build consumer profiles each of which
is a group of segments. Using the last example, the consumer profile could be {Male,
France, Phone,...}, with each entry representing a segment. Accordingly, advertisers will
create their audience by defining targeting criteria in terms of segments. For instance, a
smart phone retailer can set her targeting audience as {location=France, monthly income
> 1K, Phone}. Then when a consumer visits a publisher’s website, the consumer data
(including user identifiers, device info, URL) together with bid request will be passed
through to advertisers or their agents. An advertiser will bid on a consumer if he belongs
to predefined audience. The winner finally displays an ad of her product on the page the
consumer is browsing.
Tracking.6 In such an environment, an ad tech’s success largely depends on how
much consumer data it has, which in turn depends on the ability of tracking consumers
across web and devices. To compile a certain consumer’s browsing activities conducted
on different sites, the tracker needs to: (i) learn that the consumer is visiting a web page
when this happens; (ii) identify the consumer to associate his different browsing events
together.
The first point is mostly realized by embedding third-party codes in first-party web-
sites. When a consumer visits a web page of which the code writes that it needs content
input from third party websites, her browser will send requests to both the first party
(the website she is visiting) and the servers of the third-party websites. Information like
referrer’s URL, device info, IP addresses, etc can be passed along with the request. In this
way, a third-party tracker learns that a consumer is visiting a website that contains its
codes. The content fetched from a third party tracker’s server could be a banner/video ad
if the tracker provides ad serving service to the first-party website, or simply a 1x1 pixel
transparent GIF which is invisible to visitors if the tracker provides analytic service to
the first-party website. In web, these third-party codes are called tags and pixels. Their
counterpart in mobile apps are Third Party Libraries (TPLs) or Software Development
Kits (SDKs).
For a tracker to recognize that it is the same individual who visits a series of websites
which embedded its codes, the request sent to the tracker needs to contain a unique user
identifier attached to the consumer or to her browser. And this is mostly done via the
best-known use of cookie. Cookies are small text files that a website’s server drops in the
browser when the server responds to the browser’s request. Most importantly, it contains
6See a detailed explanation in online appendix G of the CMA Final report
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a randomly generated string of letters and numbers to serve as an identifier. For example,
suppose that both WSJ and NYT use the ad service of Google’s DoubleClick (which
would be a third-party tracker in the example). When a consumer visits WSJ for the first
time, the browser will make requests to both WSJ and DoubleClick’s servers as the page
needs both the news content and ads to fill spaces. When sending back those required
contents, WSJ and DoubleClick respectively set a cookie in the visitor’s browser. WSJ’s
cookie is called first-party cookie as this belongs to the domain the consumer is visiting,
while DoubleClick’s cookie is called third-party cookie.
Cookies are private to domains such that only the domain which sets the cookies can
read them. But cookies can be sent back whenever the browser requests content from their
owners, as long as the user didn’t delete it. Continuing with the above example, suppose
now that the consumer visits NYT. As NYT also requests ad input from DoubleClick, the
cookie set earlier by DoubleClick will be sent back along with this request. By reading
the cookie identifier, DoubleClick knows it is the same consumer who previously visited
WSJ now being on NYT. As a result, DoubleClick can compile consumer activities on
these two websites together.
One issue with cookies is that as they are randomly generated, the identifiers in cookies
set in a browser from different domains are different. As a consequence, when a publisher
uses ad tech A to serve ad whereas an advertiser partners with ad tech B, the advertiser
cannot identify the consumer of which the impression is on sale with the cookie ID set by
ad tech A. Then, ad tech B engages in cookie matching (also called cookie syncing) during
a real time bidding process in order to identify the same consumer in its own database and
to evaluate the advertiser’s willingness to pay for the impression. This process of cookie
matching is prone to failure and can result in approximately 30 percent failed matching.
In addition to cookie IDs, trackers can also use email addresses, IP addresses, user
account ID, device info etc. or the combination of them to identify consumers. In partic-
ular, trackers in mobile apps use mobile advertising ID (MAID) as user identifier, which
is unique to mobile devices and shared with all apps. Therefore all tracking parties in
mobile apps share a common identifier associated with each device and they save the
trouble of cookie matching as in the web tracking case.
Finally, to build more complete user profiles, trackers need to do cross-device tracking
and therefore to link MAIDs with cookie IDs. This can be greatly facilitated by IP
address, email addresses or first-party login details/internal IDs.
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A.1 Stylized Facts on the Competition in Ad Intermediation Market
Ad intermediation market consists of several layers along its complex value chain from
publishers to advertisers. On the supply side, there are publisher ad servers and supply
side platforms (SSPs) and on the demand side, there are demand side platforms (DSPs)
and advertiser ad servers.
Because of various acquisitions and its leverage of data, advertising inventories and
speed advantage, Google is currently the dominant player at each vertical layer of ad
intermediation. We below report Google’s market shares in the UK provided by the
CMA (2020). The publisher ad server market is monopolized by Google as Google Ad
Manager accounts for more than 90 percent of the display ads served in the UK. Google
has 50-60 percent share in the SSP market in the UK. Google’s DSP DV360 has a 30-40
percent market share. Google operates a DSP through Google Ads, which has a 10-20
percent market share. Hence, the combined market share in DSP becomes 40-60 percent
in the UK. The advertiser ad server market is highly concentrated and Google accounts
for approximately 80-90 percent of the ads served to UK users. We below describe in
details how Google gains data advantage that can be leveraged in competition.
Sources of Google’s Data Advantage:
• Google offers a wide range of leading consumer-facing services. For instance, Google
provides more than 53 consumer-facing services and products in the UK, including
Google Search, YouTube, Gmail etc (Appendix F of the CMA report, 2020, p. F8).
This allows it to collect a vast amount of first-party consumer data and to derive
valuable insights about users. For instance, search data is very useful to advertisers
as a source of learning purchase intent.
• Google can leverage the first-party data it has to attract publishers and advertisers
to use its own ad intermediary, by restricting the access to those valuable first-party
data to its proprietary platforms. To provide services, Google places its trackers on
customers’ websites and apps. According to CMA report, Google was found to be
present as a third-party in approximately 85% of websites.
• Because consumers, especially Android users, log-in their Google account on each
of their device, Google has an advantage in cross-device tracking.
• Mainstream browsers are starting to ban the use of third-party cookies to protect
consumer privacy. For instance, Apple’s Safari and Mozilla’s Firebox have blocked
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third party cookies by default and Google also plans to do so in Chrome in the
following years. This will hurt rival ad techs more than Google, as the former ones
rely more heavily on the use of third-party Cookies to collect information.
Implications for Competition Outcome. Lack of competition in ad intermedia-
tion translates into high ad tech fees, which is commonly referred to as “ad tech take”.
Ad tech take represents the difference between what advertisers pay and what publishers
earn from digital advertising. The CMA report estimates that “on average publishers re-
ceive around 65% of initial advertising revenue that is paid by advertisers (i.e the overall
‘ad tech take’ is around 35%)”. Another estimate on the ad tech tax from Wall Street
Journal could be as high as 60%. 7.
B Micro-foundation of B1
Suppose that there are N > 0 advertisers who are interested in showing ads to consumer
x.
Suppose that a given set of data about consumer x, Ωx, is available to the advertisers.
They use the data to estimate their willingness to pay. Their estimations generate a vector






x) is the kth-highest willingness to pay and is a random variable. In one
extreme of Ωx = ∅, we assume that ṽ1(∅) = ṽ2(∅) = ...,= ṽN(∅) = ve where ve is a
positive constant. In the other extreme of perfect information Ωx = Ωx, ṽi(Ω
x) = vi for
i = 1, ..., N with
v1 > v2 > ...(> v
e >)... > vN−1 > vN .
As Ωx increases from ∅ to Ωx, the expected values of ṽ1(Ωx) and ṽ2(Ωx) increase to v1 and
v2(>> v
e) whereas the expected values of ṽN−1(Ω
x) and ṽN(Ω
x) decrease to vN−1(<< v
e)
and vN .




are increasing in Ωx.
Consider two sets Ωx,A and Ωx,B such that Ωx,A∩Ωx,B = ∅. Consider two independent




uses data Ωx,B. Then, we assume that the probability that the highest bidder of one
auction will be also the highest bidder or the second-highest bidder of the other auction
is zero. This in turn implies that the outcomes of the two auctions do not depend on the
sequential order of the auctions.
Consider now expanding Ωx,B to Ωx,B′ such that Ωx,A ∩ Ωx,B′ 6= ∅. If auction A runs
before auction B, the change in Ωx,B does not affect the outcome of auction A: we here
make a simplifying assumption that advertisers are myopic and hence the advertiser with
valuation ṽ1(Ω
x,A) prefers participating in the first auction instead of giving up the first
auction in order to participate in the second auction). If auction B runs before auction A,
there is a probability p(Ωx,A ∩ Ωx,B′), which increases with Ωx,A ∩ Ωx,B′, that the winner
of auction B has either ṽ1(Ω
x,A) or ṽ2(Ω
x,A). In this case, the ad revenue of auction A will
be ṽ3(Ω
x,A) instead of ṽ2(Ω
x,A).
Finally, assume that consumer x is reader of newspaper i. She visits everyday the site
of newspaper i and another site for activity B. But the order of her visit is random: with
equal probability, she visits each site first and then visits the other site. Each site sells

















where the superscript e represents expectation. ṽe2(Ω
x,A) increases with Ωx,A. 1
2
p(Ωx,A ∩
Ωx,B′) increases with Ωx,A ∩ Ωx,B′ for given Ωx,A, which satisfies the second part of








is weakly decreasing in Ωx,A or the effect from the first com-
ponent ṽe2(Ω
x,A) should dominate the effect from the second effect.
C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 9: Recall that we assume newspapers are sufficiently differentiated
such that qM is lower than the quality chosen by the social planner. Similarly, sites in
sector B also have lower incentive of investing in quality than the social planner. As the
model’s assumptions on demand and cost functions guarantees that the social surplus
function is concave, we have WM(qM , qMB ) > W
M(qN , qNB )). Under the second part of
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assumption of B3, we have nαMd D
d(qN) + nαsD
s(qN) + αMB D






B(qNB ). Therefore, W
M(qM , qMB ) > W
M(qN , qNB ) > CS
M(qN , qNB ) −
nc(qN)− cB(qNB ) + 11−β
{
nαNd D
d(qN) + nαsD
s(qN) + αNBD
B(qNB )
}
> WN
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